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 _________________________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal by Ronald Johnstone, a former municipal 
police officer, in a federal criminal civil rights case, 18 
U.S.C. § 242, requires us to consider the correctness of jury 
instructions concerning the excessive force and intent elements 
of that offense.  We must also determine the propriety of a 
sentencing guideline enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon.1 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                     
     
1Johnstone’s appeal raises a number of other issues, but we 
find patently without merit his contentions: (1) that the jury 
instructions incorrectly stated that any bodily injury, no matter 
how temporary, would sustain criminal liability; (2) that the 
court impermissibly allowed the prosecution unilaterally to 
dismiss a count it had emphasized in its opening; (3) that the 
court improperly allowed into evidence the testimony of a lay 
witness who described the state law standard for excessive force; 
(4) that the court erred by admitting potentially prejudicial 
testimony from a colleague of Johnstone who claimed that any 
assaults carried out by Johnstone were covered up by his 
superiors; (5) that, when it sentenced Johnstone, the court 
incorrectly viewed evidence adduced at trial in the light most 
favorable to the government; and (6) that the court inaccurately 
applied the Sentencing Guidelines for aggravated assault, rather 
than minor assault. 
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 Johnstone and Richard Poplaski, former officers in the 
Kearny, New Jersey Police Department, were charged in a nine-
count indictment with the use of excessive force in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 242.  Three of the counts involved allegations 
against both Johnstone and Poplaski; six involved allegations 
against only Johnstone.  Prior to and during trial, two counts 
against Johnstone and two counts against Poplaski were dismissed, 
leaving for the jury seven counts against Johnstone and one count 
against Poplaski.  The jury convicted Johnstone of six of the 
remaining seven counts against him and acquitted Poplaski of the 
only remaining count against him.  The district court sentenced 
Johnstone to 87 months in prison and imposed a fine. 
 Central to a number of Johnstone's arguments are the 
facts underlying the conviction.  Of particular importance are 
the timing of the force and the type of force used.  Therefore, 
we will briefly describe each of the instances for which 
Johnstone was convicted, viewing the evidence presented at trial 
in the light most favorable to the government.2  
 A.  Austin Burke (Count VII) 
 On February 14, 1990, Johnstone and a fellow officer 
stopped two men on the street whom they suspected of car theft.  
Johnstone seized one of the men, Austin Burke, handcuffed him, 
and threw him against the hood of the patrol car.  Johnstone, who 
                     
     
2As we will describe below, however, the order of events underlying these 
convictions -- in particular, whether the 
assaults occurred before or after Johnstone handcuffed the 
victims -- is not crucial to resolving the legal questions at 
issue.  See infra part II. 
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is six-foot three inches and three hundred pounds, then pushed 
him against the car several more times, and punched him on the 
body.  While putting Burke in the patrol car, Johnstone thrust 
his head against its roof. 
 B.  John Blevins (Count IV) 
 The jury convicted Johnstone for his role in the arrest 
of John Blevins.  On May 14, 1990, Blevins was waiting on a 
street corner after attending a house party.  Johnstone and 
several other Kearny police officers, responding to a complaint 
about noise, arrived at the scene.  Blevins became disorderly, 
and one of the other officers started to struggle with him while 
attempting to place him under arrest.  Johnstone observed the 
struggle and moved in to assist the other officer.  After other 
officers had handcuffed Blevins and forced him to lie on the 
ground, Johnstone kicked him in the mouth and chest. 
 C.  Peter Sudziarski (Count III) 
 The jury also convicted Johnstone of employing 
excessive force against Peter Sudziarski.  On September 19, 1990, 
Johnstone and Poplaski stopped Sudziarski and a friend, who were 
driving in a stolen car.  Sudziarski fled on foot, but was 
promptly apprehended and handcuffed.  His friend evaded 
apprehension.  Immediately after handcuffing Sudziarski, one of 
the officers (it was not clear whether it was Johnstone or 
Poplaski) kicked him in the back of the head.  Later, upon 
walking Sudziarski to the patrol car, Johnstone struck him in the 
head and chest with his flashlight when Sudziarski refused to 
reveal his accomplice’s name.  Johnstone placed Sudziarski in the 
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patrol car and again asked for his accomplice’s name.  When 
Sudziarski refused to answer, Johnstone hit him across the face 
with his flashlight. 
 D.  Michael Perez (Counts V & VI) 
 Johnstone was convicted of twice using excessive force 
against Michael Perez on July 5, 1991.  Perez and five friends 
were returning to Kearny from a Fourth of July celebration in 
Jersey City when two of his friends got into a fight.  When the 
police arrived at the scene, Johnstone told Perez that he was 
under arrest, and he and several officers walked Perez to his 
squad car.  Then, while attempting to handcuff Perez, Johnstone 
struck him on the back of his head with a flashlight. 
 Perez and Johnstone exchanged words in the patrol car 
during the trip to the Kearny police station.  Upon arriving at 
the station house garage, Johnstone pulled Perez out of the car, 
and beat him, punching and kicking him in the head and on the 
body.  It was disputed at trial whether Perez remained handcuffed 
at that time. 
 E.  Robert Burden (Count IX) 
 The last incident occurred on September 1, 1991.  
Robert Burden came out of a bar and discovered that the police 
had arrested his son.  He tried to glean some information about 
the arrest from police officers at the scene, but was told by 
Johnstone to leave.  He returned to the bar.  Shortly thereafter, 
Johnstone followed him into the bar.  Upon finding him, Johnstone 
pulled Burden off his bar stool, threw him against a video 
machine and against the wall, pushed him to the floor, and kicked 
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him.  Johnstone then handcuffed Burden and took him away. 
 The district court exercised jurisdiction over the 
criminal case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over the judgment of conviction and sentence 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 II.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING EXCESSIVE FORCE 
 We address first Johnstone’s challenge to the jury 
instructions regarding excessive force.  In reviewing whether a 
district court in its charge to the jury correctly stated the 
appropriate legal standard, our review is plenary.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d  1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995).3  A 
jury charge must clearly articulate the relevant legal standards. 
 See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 881 (3d Cir. 
1994).  It must, therefore, be structured in such a way as to 
avoid confusing or misleading the jury.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1987).  To ensure that 
the district court met this requirement, we must examine the 
charge in its entirety and not limit ourselves to particular 
sentences or paragraphs in isolation.  See, e.g., Coyle, 63 F.3d 
at 1245.4   
                     
     
3Johnstone is not challenging the precise language of the charge; 
instead, he is arguing that the district court articulated the improper legal 
standard in the charge.  Were we to review the particular language employed by 
the district court 
in its charge, our review would be for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1987). 
     
4Johnstone did not object to the jury charge in the district court, and 
so we can reverse in his favor only if any error made by the district court 
was “plain.”  United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1260 n.6 (3d Cir.) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995) (“Where a party has not made a 
clear, specific objection to the charge that he alleges is erroneous at trial, 
he waives the issue on appeal ‘unless the error was so fundamental and highly 
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 The district court charged the jury as follows: “If you 
find, as to the particular count under consideration that a 
defendant used force, you should consider whether the force used 
by him was reasonable or whether it was greater than the force 
which would have been reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances to an ordinary and reasonable officer on the 
scene.”  Johnstone contends that the district court erred in 
charging the jury under a Fourth Amendment “objective 
reasonableness” standard rather than a due process standard 
because the force that he used against Sudziarski, Perez, and 
Blevins -- the conduct underlying four counts of his conviction -
- occurred after their “lawful restraint and arrest.”   
 In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme 
Court established the constitutional standard that governs claims 
that excessive force was employed during the course of an arrest. 
 According to the Court, “all claims that law enforcement 
officers have used excessive force -- deadly or not -- in the 
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a 
free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and 
its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive 
due process’ approach.”  Id. at 395.  The Court held that this 
Fourth Amendment “‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force 
case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ 
actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 
                                                                  
prejudicial as to constitute plain error.’” (quoting Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 
723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987)).  Because we 
conclude that the district court did not err in its instructions, we need not 
reach the plain error question. 
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circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 
underlying intent or motivation.”  Id. at 397. 
 While the Graham Court explained that the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard governs claims of excessive 
force during arrest, the Court acknowledged: “Our cases have not 
resolved the question whether the Fourth Amendment continues to 
provide individuals with protection against the deliberate use of 
excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends 
and pretrial detention begins, and we do not attempt to answer 
that question today.”  Id. at 395 n.10.  Nor did the Court in 
Graham precisely determine the particular point at which the 
“seizure” ends and the pre-trial detention begins, identifying 
neither a point in time, nor a place, e.g., the station house, 
that might suffice.  The Court instead relied on its prior cases 
in which it had defined a “seizure” to occur when law enforcement 
officials have “by means of physical force or show of authority . 
. . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”  Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); see also Brower v. County of 
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (seizure occurs “when there is a 
governmental termination of freedom of movement through means 
intentionally applied”).  
 Johnstone contends that the district court erred in 
instructing the jury to consider the excessive force claims under 
the Graham objective reasonableness standard.  According to 
Johnstone, Graham only governs claims that excessive force was 
carried out during the course of an arrest.  Because Sudziarski, 
Perez, and Blevins were already handcuffed when they were 
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assaulted, the argument continues, those assaults took place 
after, not during, the arrests, hence, Graham does not govern 
those counts.  Johnstone then argues that his conduct, which 
falls into the “gray” area about which the Graham Court 
explicitly reserved decision, should be weighed under a 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard.  Thus, 
Johnstone submits, the jury should have been instructed as to 
whether the force used against those three victims was excessive 
under a substantive due process “shocks the conscience” analysis, 
or, at a minimum, should have been instructed about both 
constitutional standards, and the specific facts that would 
trigger the application of each standard. 
 We disagree.  Without deciding where an arrest ends and 
pretrial detention begins, we conclude, for the reasons that 
follow, that the excessive force committed by Johnstone took 
place during the arrests of Sudziarski, Perez, and Blevins, even 
if those victims were in handcuffs.  Therefore, the district 
court correctly instructed the jury with a Fourth Amendment 
objective reasonableness standard.  Moreover, we believe that 
this case is squarely controlled by Graham, as the force at issue 
in that case took place in a similar factual context. 
 In Graham, police officers stopped Graham’s car, 
suspecting him of criminal activity.  Suffering from an insulin 
reaction, Graham emerged from his car, ran around it twice, sat 
down on the curb, and then passed out briefly.  An officer 
handcuffed him, and several officers then carried him to the car, 
placing him face down on the hood.  When he regained 
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consciousness, one of the officers shoved him (face down) against 
the hood, and then four of the officers threw him head first into 
the car.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 389.  In holding that the Fourth 
Amendment governed that case, the Graham Court implicitly held 
that an arrest is a continuing event that does not end as soon as 
a suspect is first restrained.  Moreover, because Graham was 
handcuffed at the time of his assault, Graham shows that 
handcuffing is not necessarily the point at which a seizure ends 
for purposes of the application of the Fourth Amendment. 
 We believe that the facts of Graham are nearly 
identical to those that we face in the case at bar.  Leaving 
aside for a moment the assault on Perez in the station house 
garage, each of the attacks against Perez and Blevins, and most 
of the attacks against Sudziarski took place outside the patrol 
car after the suspects had been handcuffed, just as the force in 
Graham had been employed.  Johnstone also struck Sudziarski with 
the flashlight in the patrol car, but the placement of a suspect 
in a squad car does not necessarily signal the end of an arrest. 
 Johnstone persisted in the same conduct both before and after 
putting Sudziarski in the car: Johnstone questioned him, and when 
Sudziarski refused to reveal his accomplice’s name, Johnstone 
struck him. 
 We acknowledge that Johnstone’s assault on Perez in the 
police station garage, after he had been transported from the 
scene of the initial beating, is the most troubling in this 
regard.  That assault was the closest -- both temporally and 
spatially -- to pre-trial detention at the station house.  We 
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conclude, however, that the assault in the station house garage 
also occurred during the course of Perez’s arrest.  In so doing, 
we are constrained by our holding in Groman v. Township of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628 (3d Cir. 1995), a civil case, 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, in which we held that a beating that took place when a 
suspect was removed from the police car at the station house was 
governed by the Fourth Amendment.  We perceive no difference 
between a civil and criminal case in terms of the applicable 
standard. 
 In Groman, we reversed the grant of summary judgment 
because we found that there were material facts in dispute as to 
whether the defendants had violated Groman’s Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from excessive force.  Police officers were 
called to Groman’s home because he had apparently suffered a 
minor stroke.  According to Groman, one of the officers struck 
him in the mouth.  After a brief struggle, the officers placed 
Groman in handcuffs, and then took him to the police car.  During 
the transfer to the squad car, he sustained an injury to his face 
and lost his dentures.  When they arrived at the station, Groman 
testified, the police officers dragged him from the car feet 
first, so that his head hit the ground.  After picking him up, 
one of the officers stomped on his toe, allowed him to fall, and 
an officer jumped on him.  Groman, 47 F.3d at 632-33.  We believe 
that the facts of Groman are nearly identical to those 
surrounding the beating of Perez in the station house garage, and 
we are thus bound by Groman to find that Perez’s assault took 
place during the course of the arrest, even though he had already 
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been transported to the station house.   
 United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 
1987), on which Johnstone relies to support his contention that 
the jury should have been instructed with a Fourteenth Amendment 
standard, does not undermine this conclusion.  In Messerlian, 
which involved post-handcuffing force employed in the squad car 
against a drunk-driving suspect, we upheld a conviction where the 
jury was instructed under a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
analysis.  Id. at 782 & 790 n.20.  We find Johnstone’s reliance 
on Messerlian to be unpersuasive, for two reasons.  First, it was 
decided before Graham.  Since Graham applies to force employed 
after a suspect is first restrained or handcuffed, Messerlian 
clearly falls into an area that is controlled by Graham.  Thus, 
the due process jury charge upheld in Messerlian has not survived 
Graham.  Second, although the instructions in Messerlian were 
clearly grounded on the Fourteenth Amendment, the instructions 
there did not include the “shocks the conscience” standard, which 
Johnstone urges us to employ.  Rather, the instructions closely 
resembled the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness 
instructions presented to the jury in this case.  Id. at 789 
(force violates a constitutional right if it is “excessive, 
unreasonable, and unnecessary”).5 
                     
     
5Though decided after Graham, Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (en banc), is also inapposite.  Fagan involved a high speed police 
chase, and the question whether there had been a seizure accordingly was not 
raised.  See In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 964 (3d Cir.) 
(Greenberg, J., opinion announcing the judgment of the court) (“[N]ot a single 
member of our . . . court in Fagan suggested that the proper analysis in that 
case should have centered on the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable seizures.”), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 176 (1995).  The "shocks 
the conscience" standard has been employed in other high speed police car 
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 In holding that Johnstone carried out each of the 
assaults during the course of arrest, we observe that a “seizure” 
can be a process, a kind of continuum, and is not necessarily a 
discrete moment of initial restraint.  Graham shows us that a 
citizen can remain “free” for Fourth Amendment purposes for some 
time after he or she is stopped by police and even handcuffed.  
Hence, pre-trial detention does not necessarily begin the moment 
that a suspect is not free to leave; rather, the seizure can 
continue and the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
seizures can apply beyond that point.   
 Where the seizure ends and pre-trial detention begins 
is a difficult question.  While it does seem problematic for a 
constitutional standard to change at some particular moment 
during an encounter between a citizen and a law enforcement 
official, as such encounters can be highly volatile, we need not 
draw this line here, because Johnstone’s conduct would fall 
squarely onto the seizure side of any line we would draw.  Nor 
need we decide whether the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable seizures extends beyond that line.  We therefore 
conclude that the district court did not err in its jury 
instructions concerning excessive force.6  
                                                                  
chase cases since.  Cf. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1207 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“We believe that the Fagan II shocks the conscience standard is limited to 
police pursuit cases . . . .”).     
     
6Johnstone makes two related contentions.  First, he claims that the 
district court erroneously failed to charge the jury that the use of force 
must violate New Jersey state law for such force to constitute a 
constitutional violation.  To support this argument, he relies on Messerlian 
and United States v. Dise, 763 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1985).  We disagree.  To be 
sure, in those cases this Court upheld jury instructions that referred to 
state law.  But those cases were decided before Graham.  As we have explained, 
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 III.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE INTENT  
 ELEMENT OF 18 U.S.C. § 242 
 Johnstone contends that the jury charge incorrectly 
defined the intent element of the crime for which the jury 
ultimately convicted him.  In evaluating this contention, we must 
first set forth the appropriate legal standard.  The statute 
reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
 Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, 
Territory, or District to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected 
by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . 
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned, . . . 
or both . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 242.  As is clear from the statute, the requisite 
                                                                  
the jury in the case at bar was properly instructed under the Fourth Amendment 
objective reasonableness standard, and whether a defendant violated state law 
is not relevant to that determination. 
 Second, Johnstone argues that the district court constructively 
amended the indictment by charging the jury that the Fourth Amendment 
objective reasonableness standard governed each count, when the indictment 
charged him with depriving his victims of their right to due process.  He 
contends that he was denied his Fifth Amendment grand jury right because the 
district 
Court “broaden[ed] the possible bases for conviction from that which appeared 
in the indictment,” United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 138 (1985), thus 
effectively trying him on charges for which he was not indicted.  Again, we 
disagree.  The indictment alleged as to each count that Johnstone deprived the 
victim of the “right secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, which 
includes the right to be secure in his person and free from the use of 
unreasonable force by one acting under color of law.”  We find this language 
sufficient to charge a violation of the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, and therefore 
the notice and double jeopardy functions of the 
indictment were satisfied.  An indictment is constructively amended only when 
the defendant is deprived of his “substantial 
right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a 
grand jury.”  Miller, 471 U.S. at 140 (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 
U.S. 212, 217 (1960)); see also United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1122-
23 (3d Cir. 1985).  That has not occurred here.  See also United States v. 
Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that there was no 
constructive amendment of indictment in similar case).    
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intent required therein is "willful[]."  The statute, however, 
goes no further in explaining the meaning of that intent. 
 A.  The Screws Standard 
 In the celebrated case of Screws v. United States, 325 
U.S. 91 (1945), the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the 
meaning of willful in the predecessor statute to § 242.7  It is 
not enough, the Court noted, for the defendant to exhibit "a bad 
purpose or evil intent."  Id. at 103; see also id. at 107.8  
Instead, the Court declared that willfulness requires "a specific 
intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by 
decision or other rule of law . . . ."  Id. at 103; see also id. 
at 104.  Screws also requires the violation of a particular 
right.  Clearly, the government has alleged such a violation in 
this case.  As we discussed more fully supra, that right is the 
right to be free from the use of excessive force. 
                     
     
7As quoted in Screws, the text of the predecessor statute reads in 
relevant part as follows: 
 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, 
willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of 
any State, Territory, 
or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . 
shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both. 
 
Screws, 325 U.S. at 93.  Neither party suggests, nor do we believe, that the 
slight differences between the predecessor statute and that before us now 
warrant an interpretation of "willfully" different from that provided it by 
Screws. 
     
8The opinion in Screws could muster only a plurality.  However, 
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have treated the reasoning with 
respect to the intent element of the statute as binding.  See, e.g., Anderson 
v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 
223 (1974); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1966); Williams v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1951).  Cases in this Circuit have treated 
Screws similarly.  See United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 790 (3d Cir. 
1987); United States v. Dise, 763 F.2d 586, 591-92 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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 It is not necessary, however, for the government to 
prove that the defendant was "thinking in constitutional terms 
[provided that the defendant's] aim was not to enforce local law 
but to deprive a citizen of a right and that right was protected 
by the Constitution."  Id. at 106.  The Court reconciles these 
facially inconsistent standards -- that an individual can intend 
to violate a right even if the individual is not thinking in 
terms of any right -- by recognizing that willfulness includes 
reckless disregard.  See id. at 105 ("When they act willfully in 
the sense in which we use the word, they act in open defiance or 
in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has 
been made specific and definite."); see also United States v. 
Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 791 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Dise, 763 F.2d 586, 592 (3d Cir. 1985).9  Finally, Screws held 
that willfulness can be shown by circumstantial evidence.  See 
Screws, 325 U.S. at 107; see also Dise, 763 F.2d at 592. 
                     
     
9Although Johnstone does not raise this argument in terms, the tenor of 
his challenge suggests that he would claim that § 242 requires that Johnstone 
knowingly violate federal law.  Screws clearly forecloses such an argument, 
however, when it states that a defendant need not be "thinking in 
constitutional terms" in order to be convicted of violating § 242.  Screws, 
325 U.S. at 106.  Screws is therefore in line with the characterization of 
reckless disregard in other contexts in which reckless disregard is contrasted 
with and set apart from actual knowledge.  See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125-130 (1985) (interpreting a provision in 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and differentiating between knowledge 
and reckless disregard).   
 Moreover, reckless disregard often entails some form of indifference.  
See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1270 (6th ed. 1990) ("For conduct to be 
'reckless' it must be such as to evince disregard of, or indifference to, 
consequences . . . .").  In common parlance, for an individual to be 
indifferent, he must not be concerned "one way or the other" about the 
consequences of his action.  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1151 
(1966).  A requirement that an individual know the consequences of his action 
is not antithetical to this definition of indifference, but it would introduce 
an additional element beyond lack of concern. 
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 As is evident from the text, and has oft been noted, 
Screws is not a model of clarity.10  Some of the sentences 
therein, examined in isolation, resist easy explanation and can 
be reconciled only by way of tortuous logic.  Our task, however, 
is to read these sentences in light of the text of Screws in its 
entirety.  The plurality in Screws believed its pronouncements to 
be consistent; we must do the same. 
 In simpler terms, "willful[]" in § 242 means either 
particular purpose or reckless disregard.  Therefore, it is 
enough to trigger § 242 liability if it can be proved -- by 
circumstantial evidence or otherwise -- that a defendant 
exhibited reckless disregard for a constitutional or federal 
right.  Reckless disregard has different meanings in different 
contexts.11  In the context of § 242, we have only Screws to 
                     
     
10For a more detailed discussion of Screws's somewhat opaque 
interpretation of "willfulness," see Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and 
Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights 
Crimes, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2113, 2180-86 (1993). 
     
11In Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), the Supreme Court, in the 
course of defining "deliberate indifference," discussed the different meanings 
of reckless disregard.  The Court noted that in the civil context reckless 
disregard generally entails an objective analysis; an individual exhibits 
reckless disregard if he is indifferent to a risk "that is either 
known or so obvious that it should be known."  Id. at 1978.  By contrast, in 
the criminal context, reckless disregard generally requires a subjective 
analysis; a criminal defendant exhibits reckless disregard if he is 
indifferent to a risk "of which he is aware."  Id. at 1978-79.  Later in its 
discussion, the Court 
implied, at least in dicta, that reference to background criminal law is 
proper in understanding § 242.  See id. at 1980 n.7 ("Appropriate allusions to 
the criminal law would, of course, be proper during criminal prosecutions 
under, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 242, which sets criminal penalties for 
deprivations of rights 
under color of law.").  Such a reference suggests that the reckless disregard 
standard of § 242 is subjective.  In Dise, 
supra, we seemed to agree, stating that a defendant is potentially criminally 
liable under § 242 "if he acted in 
reckless disregard of the law as he understood it."  Dise, 763 F.2d at 592 
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guide us.12 
 In sum, as is evident from the passages quoted above, 
Screws is less than satisfying in its attempt to reconcile its 
internally inconsistent mandates.  Unfortunately, any further 
attempt to explain the appropriate meaning of reckless disregard 
to a jury would probably either do violence to Screws or inject 
additional confusion into the standard that it announces; hence 
we eschew such explanation.  Fortunately, such explanation is 
unnecessary for, given the Screws standard as it now stands, we 
easily conclude that the jury charge as to intent was 
permissible. 
 B.  Validity of the Jury Charge 
 The relevant language of the charge follows: 
 The fourth element which the United States must prove 
                                                                  
(emphasis added).  Screws gives no indication as to which definition, 
objective or subjective, is correct.  We do not reach the question here 
because it is obvious that Johnstone, a trained police officer, was aware that 
federal and state law 
(recall that Johnstone was employed by a municipal police department that 
operated under state law) set boundaries within 
which the use of force is permissible and was surely aware that any use of 
force presented some risk of falling outside those 
boundaries. 
     
12Courts have looked to three Supreme Court cases decided subsequent to 
Screws for assistance in defining the intent requirement of § 242.  None, 
however, are very helpful in furthering our present undertaking.  In Williams 
v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), for example, the Court assumed -- with 
little discussion -- that police who beat a confession out of a suspect "acted 
willfully and purposely; their aim was precisely to deny the protection that 
the Constitution affords."  See id. at 102.  In United States v. Guest, 383 
U.S. 745 (1966) and Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974), the 
underlying offense was a conspiracy, prohibited under § 241.  See 
Guest, 383 U.S. at 746-47; Anderson, 417 U.S. at 213.  The gravamen of any 
conspiracy charge -- including a charge under § 
241 -- was stated to be the specific intent to achieve an illegal objective.  
See Guest, 383 U.S. at 753-54; Anderson at 223; id. 
at 234 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Neither Guest nor Anderson provide guidance 
with respect to the definition of reckless disregard. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt is that as to the count under 
consideration the defendant acted willfully.  I 
instruct you that an act is done willfully if it is 
done voluntarily and intentionally, and with a specific 
intent to do something the law forbids, that is, as 
relevant here, with an intent to violate a protected 
right.  Knowledge and intent exist in the mind.  Since 
it is not possible to look into a person's mind to see 
what went on, you must take into consideration all the 
facts and circumstances shown by the evidence and 
determine from all such facts and circumstances whether 
the requisite knowledge and intent were present at the 
time in question. 
 Knowledge and intent may be inferred from all the 
surrounding circumstances.  You may infer, for example, 
that a person ordinarily intends all the natural and 
probable consequences of an act knowingly done.  In 
other words, you may infer that a defendant intended 
all the consequences that a person standing in like 
circumstances and possessing like knowledge should have 
expected to result from his acts knowingly done. 
 You are not, of course, required to so infer.  It is 
not necessary for you to find that a defendant was 
thinking in constitutional terms at the time of the 
conduct in question.  You may find that a defendant 
acted with the required specific intent even if you 
find that he had no real familiarity with the 
Constitution or with the particular constitutional 
right involved, here the right to be free from the use 
of unreasonable or excessive force, provided that you 
find that the defendant intended to accomplish that 
which the constitution forbids.  Nor does it matter 
that a defendant may have also been motivated by 
hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion, 
provided that the specific intent which I have 
described to you is present. 
 We find nothing in the language of the charge that is 
contrary to the appropriate legal standard of § 242 as 
interpreted by Screws.  Though the charge may not be crystal 
clear, any confusion is a result of Screws itself and not of the 
charge.  The district court explained the appropriate legal 
standard, such as it is, as well as that standard could be 
explained. 
 Johnstone, however, submits that the district court was 
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required to charge the jury that it could find him guilty only if 
it found that he knowingly violated state law prohibitions 
against excessive force.  We disagree.  As we have explained, the 
underlying right Johnstone was alleged to have violated was a 
Fourth Amendment right.  Therefore, it is the Constitution itself 
that defines the standard for excessive force.  See supra note 6. 
 State law is simply of no consequence. 
 Neither is Dise nor Messerlian on point in this regard, 
notwithstanding the pronouncement in Dise that a knowing 
violation of state law demonstrates reckless disregard for 
constitutional rights, see Dise, 763 F.2d at 592, and the fact 
that Messerlian approved jury instructions requiring that the 
defendant knowingly violate state law, see Messerlian, 832 F.2d 
at 789, 791.  Even assuming that state law were relevant, nothing 
in Dise nor Messerlian requires a knowing violation of state law; 
they merely "hold that when a person acting under color of state 
law invades the personal liberty of another, knowing that such 
invasion is in violation of state law, he has demonstrated bad 
faith and reckless disregard for constitutional rights."  Dise, 
763 F.2d at 592.  That holding in no way forecloses the 
possibility that a defendant has acted in reckless disregard for 
constitutional rights without knowingly violating state law. 
 C.  Summary 
 In sum, to convict a defendant under § 242, the 
government must show that the defendant had the particular 
purpose of violating a protected right made definite by rule of 
law or recklessly disregarded the risk that he would violate such 
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a right.  The government does not need to show that the defendant 
knowingly violated any right.  We conclude that, in this case, 
the district court properly explained this standard to the jury. 
 IV.  GUIDELINE ENHANCEMENT FOR USE OF A  
 DANGEROUS WEAPON 
 We turn finally to Johnstone’s challenge to the four-
point enhancement to his base offense level under § 
2A2.2(b)(2)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Our review of the 
district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is 
plenary.  United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 451-52 (3d Cir. 
1992).  The court applied this enhancement in connection with the 
aggravated assaults on Sudziarski and Perez.  Johnstone contends 
that, in so doing, the district court engaged in impermissible 
double counting.  This is so, Johnstone claims, because the 
district court enhanced his offense level to reflect that “a 
dangerous weapon was otherwise used,” after it had classified the 
conduct underlying the convictions as “aggravated assault” within 
the meaning of § 2A2.2 because the offenses “involved” a 
dangerous weapon. 
 Section 2A2.2 provides the framework for calculating 
the offense levels for aggravated assault.  It sets a base 
offense level of fifteen for aggravated assault, which the 
comment defines as “a felonious assault that involved . . . a 
dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm.” 1994 U.S.S.G. § 
2A2.2, commentary, application note 1.13  Once a court has 
                     
     
13The commentary also defines aggravated assault to include those 
assaults “that involved . . . serious bodily injury, or . . . an intent to 
commit another felony.”  1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, 
commentary, application note 1. 
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determined that the aggravated assault, rather than the minor 
assault, guideline applies, § 2A2.2 requires graduated increases 
in the base offense level if the offense involves certain 
specific offense characteristics.  Section 2A2.2(b)(2), for 
example, provides for incremental enhancements that reflect the 
relative level of involvement of a dangerous weapon in the 
commission of the offense.  If a firearm was discharged, the 
district court is directed to increase the base offense level by 
5.  See id. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A).  If a dangerous weapon was 
“otherwise used” in the commission of the offense, the base 
offense level must be increased by 4 levels.  See id. § 
2A2.2(b)(2)(B).  And if the dangerous weapon was “brandished or 
its use was threatened,” the court must increase the offender’s 
base offense level by 3. See id. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(C). 
 Turning to the district court’s calculation of 
Johnstone’s sentence, the guideline for the substantive offense 
that most closely resembled the conduct underlying Johnstone’s 
civil rights conviction, assault, was used to calculate 
Johnstone’s base offense level.  For the convictions for the 
assaults on Sudziarski and Perez, the court found that the 
aggravated assault guideline applied, because a dangerous weapon 
-- a flashlight -- was “involved” in the offenses.  Accordingly, 
it set the base offense level for those counts at 15.  The court 
then found that the dangerous weapon -- the flashlight -- had 
been “otherwise used” in the assaults, and increased the offense 
level by four levels under § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). 
 Johnstone contends that the district court engaged in 
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impermissible double counting when it enhanced his offense level 
four points under § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B).  He complains that the 
flashlight, a “dangerous weapon,” was the basis of the 
application of the aggravated assault guideline because it was 
“involved” in the offense, and then was used again to enhance the 
offense level because this same “dangerous weapon” was “otherwise 
used” to commit the assault.  Johnstone concedes that the four-
level enhancement would not be double counting in all cases: for 
example, if a knife, an inherently dangerous weapon, was involved 
in the offense, it would not be double counting to enhance a 
defendant’s offense level if that knife was actually used in the 
course of the assault.  But he contends that the enhancement is 
impermissible in a case such as this in which the weapon is not 
inherently dangerous, but rather is a “dangerous weapon” that is 
“involved” in the offense, triggering the aggravated assault 
guideline, solely because of how it is used in the assault.   
 In other words, Johnstone’s use of the flashlight was 
counted twice in calculating his sentence because it was the 
basis of both the application of the aggravated assault provision 
and the four-point enhancement.  In so arguing, Johnstone relies 
on United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1992), and 
United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2288 (1995), in which the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit held that “while the Sentencing Guidelines 
provide a logical framework for assaults involving inherently 
dangerous weapons, the Guidelines proscribe impermissible double 
counting where it is the use of an ordinary object as dangerous 
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weapon that transforms a ‘minor’ assault into an ‘aggravated’ 
one.”  Hudson, 972 F.2d at 506. 
 We disagree, for several reasons.  In so doing, we note 
that we follow the majority of circuits that have considered this 
issue.  See United States v. Dunnaway, 88 F.3d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 
1996) (boots and bottle used as weapons); United States v. 
Sorensen, 58 F.3d 1154, 1160-61 (7th Cir. 1995) (concrete block 
used as weapon); United States v. Garcia, 34 F.3d 6, 11-12 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (car used as weapon); United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 
870, 894-96 & n.32 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Williams, 
954 F.2d 204, 205-08 (4th Cir. 1992) (use of a metal chair); see 
also United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 672-75 (1st Cir. 
1992) (similar enhancement under §2A2.2(b)(3) for serious bodily 
injury held not to be impermissible double counting).  The Second 
Circuit is the only circuit to have held that applying 
§2A2.2(b)(3)(B) can constitute double counting. 
 We begin with the observation that the four-point 
enhancement where a dangerous weapon is “otherwise used” is not 
double counting.  The aggravated assault provision and the 
specific enhancements for the relative level of involvement of a 
dangerous weapon account for different aspects of an assault.  
The aggravated assault guideline is triggered if the conduct 
“involved a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm”: the 
court must apply it if a dangerous weapon was involved in an 
assault in any capacity so long as the offender had the intent to 
do serious bodily harm with that weapon.  By contrast, the 
specific offense characteristic enhancements, including the 
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enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon that is at issue here, 
deal with the relative level of involvement of that dangerous 
weapon in the offense.  Because the first provision accounts for 
any type of involvement of a dangerous weapon in an assault if 
the defendant had the requisite intent, and the second accounts 
for the specific type of involvement of that weapon, the 
provisions deal with different conduct and hence there is no 
double counting. 
 We are not persuaded that this conclusion is any less 
true when the weapon is an ordinary object, such as the large 
flashlight used by Johnstone in the assaults against Sudziarski 
and Perez.  There is no basis in the Guidelines or in the 
commentary for distinguishing between ordinary objects and 
inherently dangerous weapons.  Moreover, the Guidelines consider 
a “dangerous weapon” to be “an instrument capable of inflicting 
death or serious bodily injury.”  1994 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, 
commentary, application note 1(d).  Ordinary objects, such as 
large flashlights, are clearly “capable” of inflicting death or 
serious bodily injury without being employed, and hence they 
clearly fall within the definition of aggravated assault even if 
they are not actually used in the offense.  Thus, such an object 
could be “involved” in an offense, triggering the aggravated 
assault guideline, even if it is not “otherwise used” in the 
offense. 
 But even if the four-level enhancement for the use of a 
deadly weapon might in some cases, including this one, constitute 
“double counting,” this double counting is permissible because it 
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is explicitly mandated by the clear and unambiguous language of § 
2A2.2.  See supra pp.22-23.  A court must make all applicable, 
mandatory adjustments unless the Guidelines specifically exempt 
the particular conduct at issue.  See id. § 1B1.1(b) (“Determine 
the base offense level and apply any appropriate specific offense 
characteristics contained in the particular guideline in Chapter 
Two . . . .”).   
 We have held that a court must follow this rule even if 
it would lead to counting a particular factor twice in 
calculating a defendant’s sentence.  We addressed the 
permissibility of double counting under the Guidelines in United 
States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667 (3d Cir. 1993).  See also United 
States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1315-16 (3d Cir. 1996).  In 
those cases, we noted that the Sentencing Commission was aware of 
the potential for double counting inherent in some of the 
provisions, and that, accordingly, the Guidelines specifically 
forbid double counting in certain, enumerated circumstances.  For 
example, the commentary to §§ 3A1.1, 3A1.2, and 3A1.3 states 
explicitly that victim-related enhancements based on certain 
conduct are not permitted if the applicable offense guideline 
already accounts for the same conduct.  See Wong, 3 F.3d at 670. 
 Based on this understanding, we held that: 
the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius applies.  Following these principles, 
we conclude that the exclusion of a double counting 
provision in the [certain] sections . . . was by 
design.  Accordingly, an adjustment that clearly 
applies to the conduct of an offense must be imposed 
unless the Guidelines exclude its applicability. 
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Id. at 670-71 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).14 
 Thus, because the Sentencing Commission has not expressly 
forbidden double counting in applying the aggravated assault 
guideline, we hold that the district court correctly granted the 
four-point enhancement even if doing so might in some sense 
constitute double counting.15  
 To hold otherwise would frustrate the structure of the 
Guidelines and their goal of ensuring the proportionality of 
federal sentences, as the other circuits that we follow have 
observed.  Implicit in the aggravated assault guideline is the 
understanding that certain aggravated assaults are more serious 
than others.  In crafting the aggravated assault provision, the 
Sentencing Commission sought to take different levels of 
culpability into account: this guideline assumes that defendants 
are more culpable if they “use” a dangerous weapon in the 
commission of an offense than if they merely possess that weapon 
with the intent to do bodily harm.  We follow the Fourth Circuit 
in noting that “[w]e cannot . . . deprive the Sentencing 
Commission of its authority to assign incrementally higher 
                     
     
14Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means: the “expression of one 
thing is the exclusion of another.” Black’s 
Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990). 
     
15We note that the Second Circuit, the sole circuit to have held that the 
enhancement for the use of a dangerous weapon constitutes double counting 
unless the weapon is inherently dangerous, has explicitly refrained from 
holding that the Guidelines bar double counting only in a few, specifically 
enumerated, circumstances.  See Hudson, 972 F.2d at 507; United 
States v. Olvera, 954 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1992).  Hence, that circuit can 
find that an enhancement constitutes impermissible double counting even if the 
Guidelines have not expressly forbidden double counting in the provision at 
issue. 
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sentences based on important factors such as the degree of the 
weapon’s involvement and the degree of the victim’s injury.”  
Williams, 954 F.2d at 207; Reese, 2 F.3d at 896 n.32 (“The 
relevant way to describe what is going on here is that the use of 
a weapon transformed [the defendant’s] offense from a minor 
assault to an aggravated-assault-in-which-a dangerous-weapon-was-
otherwise-used.  That we use a single sentencing factor ‘twice’ 
to trace the effects of this transformation (first to distinguish 
minor from aggravated assaults, then to distinguish more and less 
culpable aggravated assaults) is merely an accidental by-product 
of the mechanics of applying the Guidelines.”).   
 In sum, we conclude that the district court properly 
interpreted Sentencing Guidelines § 2A2.2. 
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
